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ABSTRACT:  By bringing the Napoleonic wars to an end, the battle of Waterloo gave the last 
impetus to a nightmarish political juggernaut that in little over a decade managed to dislocate a 
centuries-old global Iberian world. To a limited extent, it was also a contributing factor in 
unleashing an era of civil war that resulted in the secession of most of the Spanish American 
dominions and in an ideological battleground between conservative and progressive, centralists 
and autonomic forces. Portugal fared no better, troubled by domestic crises and the eventual 
unravelling of the Lusitanian Empire through the emergence of an independent Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
Twenty-four hours after receiving a royal decree signed in Madrid on 3 July 1815, all churches 
under the jurisdiction of the Spanish Monarchy – the tri-continental realm that extended from the 
Mediterranean to cover much of the Americas and the Philippines in Asia – were expected to 
perform a Te Deum in thanks for the 'extremely important and very marked victory obtained 
over the common enemy’ in the battle of Waterloo on 18 June.1 The royal command, issued to 
 
guarantee an immediate public expression of gratitude, encapsulated the prevailing hope in the 
Spanish establishment that the concluding campaign of the Napoleonic wars would somehow 
serve to put the genie back in the bottle, 
2 
instantly erasing a web of complex processes that in 
little over a decade managed to dislocate a centuries-old global Iberian world. In this article it 
will be suggested that far from achieving this goal, the battle of Waterloo constituted the element 
that was missing to complete a nightmarish political juggernaut. It was also, to a limited extent, 
a contributing factor in unleashing over two decades of civil war in the Spanish Monarchy that 
would result in the secession of most of the Americas and in an ideological battleground 
between conservative and progressive, centralists and autonomic forces. Neighbouring Portugal 
fared little better, both in terms of domestic crises and the eventual unravelling of the Lusitanian 
 
Empire through the emergence of an independent Brazil. 
 
 
Since his ascent to power in 1799, Napoleon felt under the constant shadow of Britain. 
4
 
 
At the time, Spain was a French ally, while Portugal was a neutral power with long-recognised 
British sympathies. The naval defeat at Trafalgar in October 1805 ended Napoleon’s hope of 
beating the British at their own game. It did not destroy, as it is widely believed, the Spanish 
navy which remained the third largest in number of ships of the line (lost ten of forty-two) and 
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strong enough to fight the Royal Navy in thirty-five different scenarios during the following two 
years, including twenty-seven actions with positive outcomes for the Spaniards.
5 
Anglo-Spanish 
confrontations  also took place on land. On 27 June 1806 a British force of 1,500 men under 
William Carr Beresford attempted to gain control of the River Plate – a large estuary between 
what is now Argentina and Uruguay – by conquering the dominant city, Buenos Aires. They 
succeeded in controlling the town for about six weeks, but finally had to surrender to a force 
mainly composed of creole militia led by Santiago de Liniers y Bremond, a French nobleman at 
the service of Spain. In an unprecedented move, he was appointed as viceroy by the locals to 
replace the peninsular-appointed incumbent who had fled. A second invasion followed in 1807, 
under Lieutenant-General John Whitelocke. After losing more than half of their force in street 
fighting, the British signed a ceasefire on 7 July and left for home, where Whitelocke was court- 
martialled and discharged.
6 
The attempt to weaken the Spanish Monarchy by seizing a strategic 
part of its territory in the Americas had been neutralized. 
 
The global Iberian world, nonetheless, remained under threat – now from unforeseen 
quarters. In November 1806, Napoleon issued the Berlin Decrees establishing the so-called 
‘Continental System’ – a scheme destined to stop all trade of British goods into Europe. A year 
later, in Milan, he tightened the grip by ordering all allies of France, as well as all countries who 
wanted to be considered neutral, to cease trade with the British – continuing his attempt to 
clearly divide Europe into two clear-cut camps by painting those that did not comply with 
France’ demands as France’s enemies.7 Portugal became the most obvious potential hole in 
Napoleon’s continental dyke. Consequently, the Emperor demanded the closure of Portugal’s 
ports to British ships, the confiscation of British merchandise, and the arrest of British subjects. 
Lisbon complied with the first demand, but balked at the second and third. France raised the 
stakes, insisting on garrisoning and commanding Portugal’s coastal fortresses. At the same time, 
secretly, Napoleon negotiated a treaty with the Spanish king Charles IV of the Bourbon family 
(the Treaty of Fontainebleau) by which they agreed to partition the Portuguese world – Spain 
was to seize Portugal and Portuguese America while France was to control their trade routes in 
Africa and Asia. It was then that Britain issued Portugal’s Prince Regent Joao with an ultimatum 
to either renew treaty obligations and evacuate Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, or else be 
abandoned and witness its fleet burned by the Royal Navy – a repeat of Britain’s performance 
just months earlier in Copenhagen’s harbour, to prevent the seizure and use of its warships by 
the French.
8 
The Portuguese were left in an impossible situation. Either support Napoleon and 
 
have their fleet – by implication their livelihood – destroyed by Britain or support Britain and 
3 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in The RUSI Journal on 
30/06/2015, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/10.1080/03071847.2015.1058072 
 
 
start a war with Napoleon. Word of movement of French troops in the Pyrenees pushed them 
towards the British option. Prince Regent Joao was thus forced to preside over the largest 
transoceanic migration of an imperial capital in history: from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. A court 
of nearly 15,000 people set sail on 29 November 1807.
9 
This extraordinary exodus was to have a 
 
crucial impact on future developments, not just for the history of Portugal and Brazil, but also 
for the conduct of the rest of the Napoleonic conflict. 
 
Rumours about movement of troops in the Franco-Spanish frontier were well-founded. 
On 20 October 1807, 25,000 French troops were indeed seen crossing the Pyrenees. They had 
been invited to traverse Spanish territory on the way to conquer Portugal by the terms of the 
above mentioned Treaty of Fontainebleau.
10 
Such was the trust that the Spanish Bourbons had 
placed in France, their traditional ally, that the incursion went ahead nine days before the 
document was formally signed (27 October 1807). Alas, for reasons historians are still debating, 
but that seem to revolve around the fact that confidence was not mutual, Napoleon decided to 
renege on the deal.
11 
Soon imperial forces secured key ports in Catalonia and the Basque 
country, including four important fortresses. What neither the Bourbons nor Napoleon had 
predicted was the hostile reception French troops were to receive in many places during the 
following months. Revolts sprung up in Pamplona and Burgos; two French soldiers were 
murdered in Vitoria and over a hundred were seriously wounded in clashes with the inhabitants 
of poor neighbourhoods of Barcelona who, primitive as they may have been in the eyes of the 
invaders, were bright enough to ponder why the French would want to install themselves in the 
Mediterranean coast if their target was Portugal.
12 
These episodes have been obscured in much 
of the historiography because they took place amid a domestic political crisis with which they 
were probably entangled and confused. Tainted by years of government inefficiency, corruption 
and personal scandal, the man who had negotiated the secret treaty with Napoleon, the válido 
(prime minister) Manuel de Godoy had become a target for hatred. Rumours that the King and 
his wife were to be spirited away to the safety of South America – emulating the experience of 
the Portuguese royal family – triggered a mutiny at Aranjuez on 17–19 March 1808 that not only 
unseated Godoy, but also placed the monarch´s son, the untested Ferdinand VII, on the throne. 
 
With all the difficulties encountered in Spain, the French had, nonetheless, arrived in 
Portugal in November 1807, finding little resistance in their way to Lisbon which they soon 
occupied. In February 1808 their commander, Jean-Andoche Junot, declared Joao and the 
Braganza dynasty deposed and took over the ruling of the country, mainly by seeking support 
from local afrancesados – sympathisers of the Napoleonic regime. However, this group was not 
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sizeable enough and Junot was forced to govern over an increasingly restless populace. Risings 
in Porto, Minho and Algarve  took place at the same time as ordinary Spaniards were expressing 
hostility against French forces that remained on Spanish soil – indeed, one French commander 
suspected the existence of a co-ordinated luso-hispanic action against them.
13 
Although this was 
probably paranoia more than anything else, the fact that the French felt unwelcome in Iberia 
from the start contributed to create a siege mentality that influenced their war decisions. 
Meanwhile, London could not allow Portugal to remain in French hands with the support of the 
Spanish Bourbons.
14 
That would have left Britain without access to the European continent and 
endangered all her trading global routes. In January 1808, Whitehall began assembling 9,000 
troops at Cork to engage in a ‘liberating’ invasion of Spanish Venezuela to be led by Sir Arthur 
Wellesley. He was to be accompanied by the campaigner of South American independence 
Francisco de Miranda, who had already launched a similar attempt a little over a year earlier – 
the Leander expedition that ended in spectacular failure because of lack of local support.
15 
In 
1806, there was no appetite for independence in Spanish America. To defeat Napoleon, Britain 
 
was now prepared to open that appetite by force.
16
 
 
 
While this was happening, Napoleon invited Charles IV, disgruntled at having been 
ousted by his son, for discussions at Bayonne, seemingly to mediate a family reconciliation.
17
 
Similar invitations were issued to Ferdinand VII and the rest of the household. So enamoured 
was the Spanish regime with the might of the French Emperor that the majority of the members 
of the ruling cabinet – the Council of Castile – followed them in procession to the French side of 
the frontier. By early May, not hearing from them, it seemed clear that the Bourbons were being 
kidnapped. It was soon after the last member of the family, the fourteen-year old infante (prince) 
Francisco de Paula departed the capital that the legendary popular rising of Dos de Mayo 
(Second of May) took place to be callously suppressed by Marshall Joachim Murat. Goya’s 
Third of May painting depicts one of the many executions carried out after the French seized 
Madrid; its fame is well-deserved for epitomising the spirit of Spanish defiance that spread as 
fire not just within Iberia but throughout the whole of the Hispanic world. 
 
To gain an understanding of the nature and global reach of this reaction, it is necessary to 
bear in mind that for nearly two hundred years, the Spanish Monarchy had been the largest 
single polity in the world. In Europe, as an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire, it once 
controlled the Netherlands, many of the German states, Portugal and Italy. Although these 
territories had been lost by the end of the eighteenth century, in the Napoleonic era the Spanish 
Monarchy still held a good part of North America, most of Central and South America and the 
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Philippines. Crucially, the term ‘Spanish Monarchy’ did not allude only to the system of 
government - it was the name of the supranational socio-economic, cultural and political entity 
that encompassed all these territories in three continents (four if the African enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla were to be factored in).
18 
Except as a cartographical reference, ‘Spain’ did not yet 
exist. It is also worth noting that the Spanish world had a long tradition of independent 
communes dating back to the early Middle Ages. These communes soon established alliances 
that were held together in the person of single seigneurs, princes or kings – such as those of 
Asturias, Aragon and Castile – whose kingdoms eventually converged to give life to the Catholic 
Spanish Crown with a single monarch. In juridical terms, the Americas were an integral part of 
the kingdom of Castile. This explains why Castilian was, and remains, the main language of that 
part of the world. Catalans, Basques, Dutch, Germans and Italians who during many decades 
were also subjects of the Spanish monarch could travel, reside and work in the Americas, but 
they had to operate under Castilian law and use the Castilian language as their main means of 
communication.
19
 
Therefore, news of Napoleon’s seizure of the Spanish Bourbon family could not but 
shake much of the world as an earthquake. Wellesley’s expedition to Spanish Venezuela was 
diverted to Portugal. The imprisonment of Ferdinand VII also raised the question of the 
constitution of the Spanish Monarchy. Had the king been killed, the problem would have 
probably been simpler to resolve: kingship would have fallen to the next in the line of 
succession. With the king alive, the issue was who else could play his part – ad interim – in the 
constitutional arrangement that had organised the Hispanic world for more than three hundred 
years. A scheme for short-term emergencies had been devised by the Castilian medieval Law of 
Partidas, which called for the formation of local governments by ‘magistrates, priests, rich men 
and other good and honest men’.21 Consequently, in the wake of the collapse of the central 
administration, civil juntas took control of the government in all the Spanish dominions. Even in 
Catalonia, with Barcelona already occupied by the French, juntas were organised in the towns of 
Lerida, Manresa, Tortosa, Villafranca del Panades and Gerona. By the end of June, all were 
united under a General Junta of the Principality of Catalonia. Similar was the situation in the rest 
of the Hispanic world. All these bodies – from the junta of Manila to the ones in Buenos Aires, 
Caracas, Oviedo and Seville – claimed to exercise sovereign power directly on behalf of 
Ferdinand VII as the embodiment of the Spanish monarchy.
22 
Crucially, almost all of these 
 
juntas raised their own armies.
23
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Popular resistance against Napoleon often expressed itself violently  – its grass-roots 
nature exemplified in the rising of Second May and the sieges of Zaragoza and Gerona. It was 
during these years that Spaniards gave to the modern world two terms: guerrilla and 
liberalism.
24 
In polite circles people had begun to talk about a state of ‘revolution’ rather than 
about a state of ‘war’. Among the Spanish Patriots there were a few who saw the conflict not just 
 
in terms of a struggle for self-determination and against the tyranny of Napoleon, but against all 
sorts of tyrannies, including those at home. This view was to express itself in concrete terms 
with the ‘Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy’, better known as the Cadiz 
Constitution of 1812 and rightly described by the historian Raymond Carr as the Liberal Codex 
of the early 19th century.
25 
Many Spaniards, however, failed to see the need for political reform, 
at least at this point, and those who did were unsatisfied with the outcome. When Napoleon had 
his brother Joseph placed on the throne in Madrid he had also dispatched agents to the Americas 
to convince the Spanish overseas dominions to come back to the fold. By 1810 some American 
juntas had already begun to demand autonomy within the Spanish Monarchy; a year later, a few 
even called for secession from a Spanish Patriot regime that seemed doomed to collapse. None, 
still, ever sided with the French.
26
 
 
 
For Napoleon this was a terrible failure. It implied leaving in the hands of his enemies 
open access to human and material resources to wage war against his empire indefinitely. 
Because the ‘Spanish war of independence’ (as the Peninsular War is still called in Spain) 
became the struggle of Spanish Americans, Spanish Filipinos and Spanish Europeans against the 
imperial regime that had deprived them of the factor that amalgamated the Hispanic world – 
their Catholic monarch. Moreover, while Joao governed Brazil and controlled African and Asian 
affairs from Rio de Janeiro,
27 
Portugal was practically left in the hands of the British commander 
of the Portuguese army, who became a de facto viceroy. This was none other than the man who 
had led the first failed invasion of Buenos Aires, William Carr Beresford.  Under his influence, 
Portugal was turned into little more than a barrack-state. All human and material resources were 
directed to the war effort. The last French incursion into Portugal by Marshal André Masséna 
was repelled when Wellesley retreated behind the lines of Torres Vedras, an impregnable system 
of defence works he made to build. By March 1811, the French were definitely expelled from 
Portugal.
28 
Victory, sadly, came at a heavy price. In four years of war, Portugal’s population 
declined by fifteen per cent out of a total of around two million and the economic infrastructure 
was dilapidated, particularly the country’s roads –never particularly good to begin with – were 
seriously damaged, becoming obstacles to commercial activity. Worst, Joao had no plans to 
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return to Portugal – indeed, he did not do so until almost a decade later, following a liberal 
revolution in Lisbon in 1820, and leaving his heir Pedro as regent in Rio de Janeiro. In 1822, 
Pedro declared Brazil independent. 
 
The situation in the Hispanic world was far more tortuous. Surrender of the last French 
troops on Spanish territory only took place when Napoleon was already on his way to Elba, on19 
May 1814).
29 
After six years of pitched battles and ruthless insurgency, Spaniards were left 
deeply traumatised, physically and psychologically exhausted. A sense that peace was in some 
way unreachable lingered, regardless of international treaties, only to be magnified by 
Napoleon’s Hundred Days (20 March to 8 July 1815).30 Since 1810, encouraged by the 
experience of self-rule during the British invasions, Buenos Aires had cut all relations with the 
Peninsula and, while not declaring independence, waged war against loyalist Montevideo, which 
eventually fell under its control in May 1814. So by the time Ferdinand VII returned to his 
throne, Buenos Aires and Montevideo had already been lost for good. The same seemed likely to 
occur with Chile that from September 1810 had also cut off relations with the Peninsula. 
However, an expedition dispatched from Lima defeated Chilean and Argentine forces in the 
battle of Rancagua (2 October 1814) and Chile remained within the Spanish Monarchy for a 
further three years. In 1815, therefore, the hope of returning to the status quo ante bellum 
transmitted between the lines of the Spanish royal decree regarding Waterloo was not wholly 
unreasonable. Yet it was already telling that the sole representatives of the Spanish army in that 
 
battle, General Miguel Ricardo de Alava and Captain Nicolás de Minuisir, merited no mention in 
that text or in any other official communication - an omission attributable to their liberal 
sympathies.
35 
Political disunity was to become a constant feature of Spanish life for years to 
come. That the Spanish Monarchy would end up beleaguered and reduced to the status of a 
medium-size European power with small Caribbean dominions and just a foothold in Asia may 
not have been inevitable,
36 
but it was certainly predictable. By bringing the Napoleonic wars to 
an end, victory at Waterloo made possible the demobilization of thousands of British soldiers 
who then looked for employment in other theatres of war, including those of rebellious Spanish 
America. In that continent they were to play important roles in various emancipatory 
campaigns,
37 
albeit defying Whitehall’s stubborn respect for the integrity of the Spanish 
Monarchy, a policy based on the mistaken belief that trade concession could be gained from the 
restored Bourbon regime in return for non-interference. Britain’s official position did not change 
for many years – this to such an extent that a royal proclamation in 1817 barred Britons from 
joining the rebel armies of Spanish America. The prohibition became law in 1819 as the Foreign 
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Enlistment Act.
38 
It was not until 1824, that Britain finally made the first move to recognize the 
independence of the new Latin American republics.
39 
The die, however, had been cast almost a 
decade earlier in the muddy battlefields of Belgium. 
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